This paper presents a conceptual architecture for an AI-Driven Adaptive Encryption Device (AI-AED), a tri-modular hardware platform embodied in a registered industrial design. The device integrates a Secure Input Module, an AI-Enhanced Central Processing Unit with biometric authentication, and a Secure Output Module connected by unidirectional buses. We formalise the adaptive encryption policy as a constrained Markov decision process (CMDP) over a discrete action space of 216 cryptographic configurations, with safety constraints that provably prevent convergence to insecure states. A formal threat model based on extended Dolev–Yao assumptions with four physical access tiers defines attacker capabilities, and anti-downgrade safeguards enforce a monotonically non-decreasing security floor during threat escalation. An information-theoretic analysis shows that adaptive algorithm selection contributes an additional entropy term H (α) to ciphertext uncertainty, upper-bounded by log2 (|Lₑnc|) ≈ 1. 58 bits, while noting this represents increased attacker uncertainty rather than a strengthening of any individual cipher. A component-level latency model estimates 0. 91–1. 00 ms pipeline latency under normal operation and 3. 14–3. 42 ms under active threat, including integration overhead. Simulation validation over 1000 episodes compares a tabular Q-learning baseline against the proposed Deep Q-Network operating on the continuous state space: the DQN achieves 82% fewer constraint violations, 6× faster threat response, and more stable policy switching, demonstrating the advantage of continuous-state reinforcement learning for safety-critical adaptive encryption. All claims are positioned as theoretical contributions requiring empirical validation through prototype implementation.
Pawar et al. (Fri,) studied this question.