Critical Theory, Transcendental Phenomenology, and the Status of Reason: Horkheimer and Habermas on Husserl’s Idea of Rigorous Philosophical Science

This article critically interrogates Max Horkheimer’s and Jürgen Habermas’s criticisms of Husserl’s idea of phenomenological philosophy as a rigorous science. It argues that both critical theorists basically misconstrue Husserl’s understanding of philosophical method and, consequently, miss an opportunity to engage not only with transcendental phenomenology’s critique of modern mathematical natural science but also with its significance for the renewal of a concept of substantive reason consistent with critical theory. Although Horkheimer posits, without ever properly clarifying, such a concept of reason and Habermas’s project centres on rethinking this concept, the lingering positivist and pragmatist presuppositions of both thinkers hinders serious engagement with Husserl’s thought.