Pan-Perceptualism and Pan-Mnemism: Process Philosophy in Ultrametaphysical Terms

Whitehead's process philosophy challenges fixity, stability, and permanence. While it moves away from the core assumptions of traditional Western metaphysics, it is seldom portrayed as offering an alternative to metaphysics; instead, it is proposing a different process-oriented alternative metaphysics. This distinction between metaphysics and its alternatives—what Malabou has termed ultrametaphysics—is explored here through the contrast between pan-perceptualism and the pan-mnemism. The comparison provides a new framework for examining two traditions that have rarely engaged in dialogue over the last hundred years: one inaugurated by Whitehead and Bergson and the other encompassing Heidegger, Derrida, and Malabou herself. I propose that the distinction between metaphysics and ultrametaphysics may lie in terms of a distinction between perception and memory.