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Abstract Dominant personality models of the self‐concept (e.g. self‐schema theory) conceive of the self as a relatively stable cognitive representation or schema. The self‐schema controls how we process self‐relevant information across a myriad of situations. Conversely, self‐categorization theory argues that self‐perception is highly variable and context‐dependent. It was hypothesized in two studies ( N =114 and 200) that the effect of personal self‐schemas on information‐processing would be eliminated when the context makes a conflicting higher‐order identity salient. Results largely supported self‐categorization theory. Across various dependent measures (trait endorsements, response latencies, and confidence in self‐descriptions), participants generally responded in line with the salient identity, even if this pattern of responding directly contradicted their personal self‐schema. Implications for dominant personality models of the self‐concept are examined. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Onorato et al. (Wed,) studied this question.
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