On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership

Claude d’Aspremont; Alexis Jacquemin; Jean J. Gabszewicz; John A. Weymark

doi:10.2307/134972

February 1, 1983Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique

On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership

View at Publisher

Ask AI

Bookmark

Share

Key Points

This research aims to explore the conditions under which collusive price leadership remains stable within markets.
Theoretical modeling of collusive behavior among firms.
Analysis of market dynamics and stability conditions.
Exploration of price-setting strategies based on market structure.
Identified key factors that influence the stability of collusive price leadership.
Found that market structure plays a significant role in sustaining collusion.
Demonstrated that certain pricing strategies enhance stability under collusion.

Implication

Theoretical analysis shows implications of collusive price leadership on market stability.

Abstract

Claude D'Aspremont, Alexis Jacquemin, Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz, John A. Weymark, On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership, The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 17-25

Discussion

No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.

Cite This Study

d’Aspremont et al. (1983) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69d76be2f44a16d01ef30e43 https://doi.org/10.2307/134972

View at Publisher

Ask AI

Bookmark

Share

On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership

Key Points

Implication

Abstract

Discussion

Cite This Study

On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership

Key Points

Implication

Abstract

Discussion

Cite This Study

Keep reading

Keep reading