This paper puts forward a computationally-based notion of proof and explores its implications to computation at large. In particular, given a random oracle or a suitable cryptographic assumption, we show that every computation possesses a short certificate vouching its correctness, and that, under a cryptographic assumption, any program for a /spl Nscr//spl Pscr/-complete problem is checkable in polynomial time. In addition, our work provides the beginnings of a theory of computational complexity that is based on "individual inputs" rather than languages.< <ETX xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">></ETX>
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Silvio Micali (2002) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: