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The aim of this article is to pinpoint some of the features that do-or should-make Aristotelianism attractive to current moral educators.At the same time, it also identifies theoretical and practical shortcomings that contemporary Aristotelians have been overly cavalier about.Section II presents a brisk tour of ten of the 'pros': features that are attractive because they accommodate certain powerful and prevailing assumptions in current moral philosophy and moral psychology-applying them to moral education.Section III explores five versions of the view that Aristotle's position is somehow anachronistic and out-dated.As none of those bears scrutiny, Section IV addresses ten features of Aristotelianism that do not seem to sit well with contemporary moral philosophy and psychology: the genuine 'cons' of Aristotelianism.It is subsequently argued that if we want to avoid acquiring Aristotelianism on the cheap, those less attractive features need to be engaged head-on: reinterpreted, revised or simply rejected. I INTRODUCTIONIn many subject-matters, to think correctly is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or not, even though we may not know it (Newman, 1982(Newman, [1873]], p. 83).This article is about the pros and cons of Aristotelianism in contemporary moral education.My aim is to pinpoint some of the features that do-or should-make Aristotelianism attractive to contemporary moral educators.At the same time, I also propose to identify theoretical and practical shortcomings that Aristotelian educationists have been too cavalier about so far.Before turning to the main content of the article, however, it will be instructive to preface it with some historical observations that motivate its writing.
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Kristján Kristjánsson (2013) studied this question.
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