The Logic of Four Alternatives

I AM WRITING ON the Buddhist of the four (catuskoti), as it appears for the first time in the Pali Nikdyas, for three reasons. First, it appears to be a typical East-West in philosophy. Secondly, it is evident that if the thesis adduced in this article is correct, the problem has baffled both Indian as well as Western scholars, and among Indian scholars we have to reckon classical scholars held in great esteem, such as NMgdrjuna. Finally, this system of should be of some interest to modern students of logic, not only because it provides a novel method of classifying propositions into logical alternatives, but also because it does so in such a manner that the are not dependent on the number of truthvalues assumed in the system of logic. The nature and significance of reasons would become evident if we give an exact exposition of this of four alternatives, which was known in the later Buddhist tradition as the catuskoti (tetralemma). But it must be borne in mind that to call this the logic of four alternatives is already to adduce a theory which needs to be proved in the light of all the available evidence. I have previously given some account of this system of logic,' but it stands in need of further clarification and exact definition, which I propose to attempt in this article, avoiding as far as possible any repetition of what I have already said on the subject. In the Pali Nikdyas the four are referred to as these four positions (imesu catusu thanesu) 2 and it is said that religious teachers at the time were trying to state the nature of the existence of the perfect person after death without going outside four positions (aiiiiatra imehi catuhi thanehi).3 These references seem to suggest that they were regarded as four logical and it was believed that the truth with regard to any matter lay, perhaps, in one of alternatives.