This article attempts to study Soviet strategic cavalry in the 1920s based on regulatory documentation as well as military-theoretical and military-training materials of the Red Army. The goal set in this work is to examine the key provisions of Soviet military doctrine during this period as applied to the strategic cavalry units of the Red Army. This goal is supported by achieving intermediate tasks: defining the model of cavalry use in tactical engagements and operational actions, investigating ways to modernize the cavalry to bring its combat power to the level of modern branches of the armed forces, and comparing methods of modernization and application of strategic cavalry in battle in countries with the most developed armies of that time, namely England and France. The research is based on historical-descriptive, historical-genetic, and historical-comparative methods, which track the history of Soviet strategic cavalry in dynamics and in comparison with the cavalry of other countries. The scientific novelty of this work lies in examining the processes of defense construction in the USSR in the 1920s through the lens of modernization of strategic cavalry in comparison with similar processes abroad, allowing for a broader perspective on military modernization, particularly the modernization of cavalry, while considering the historical context and narrative backdrop. A key conclusion reached by the author in the article is that under the influence of the experiences of World War I and the Civil War, as well as by studying international military practices, Soviet military leadership kept pace with the times, striving to bring the cavalry to an acceptable level of combat training and technical equipment; moreover, examining foreign sources allows for the conclusion about the synchronicity of military construction processes occurring in the USSR on one hand and in England and France on the other, in relation to strategic cavalry, which provides grounds to adjust established perceptions in literature regarding the archaic views of Soviet military leaders of that time.
Artur Ravilevich Khusnulin (Wed,) studied this question.