COVID vaccination and economic game decisions: The role of analytical thinking

Non-vaccination is often described as non-cooperation, particularly as free-riding (i.e. the exploitation of others who cooperated), but empirical studies linking non-vaccination with non-cooperation/free-riding are scarce. The current study recruited 758 participants from the Prolific platform when the most severe COVID variant (Delta) was circulating. We examined whether the vaccinated and non-vaccinated differed in their decisions in various economic games (including social dilemmas and resource-allocation games) and whether such differences were explained by relevant dispositional traits (dark traits, generalized trust, and analytical thinking). We particularly aim to see whether traits that explained the link between vaccination and game decisions, also predicted vaccination itself. Results show no differences between vaccination groups in social-dilemma decisions involving the potential to free-ride. Instead, vaccination was only associated with resource-allocation decisions without elements of cooperation or exploitation. Specifically, supportive vaccination (getting vaccinated coupled with having a positive attitude toward vaccines) was associated with outcome-maximization in resource-allocation games, and this was largely explained by higher analytical thinking ability. Higher analytical thinking ability also predicted vaccination itself, and this link was partially mediated by generalized trust. Regardless of whether the act of non-vaccination itself is free-riding or not, the current study suggests that the motivations behind non-vaccination may relate more to weaknesses in analytical thinking. Our findings may inform about how to improve the strategies used to promote vaccination.