Do discrete emotions exist?

Abstract In various guises (usually referred to as the "basic emotion" or "discrete emotion" approach), scientists and philosophers have long argued that certain categories of emotion are natural kinds. In a recent paper, Colombetti (Citation2009) proposed yet another natural kind account, and in so doing, characterized and critiqued psychological constructionist approaches to emotion, including our own Conceptual Act Model. In this commentary, we briefly address three topics raised by Columbetti. First, we correct several common misperceptions about the discrete emotion approach to emotion. Second, we discuss misconceptions of our Conceptual Act Model. Finally, we briefly comment on Columbetti's Dynamical Discrete Emotion model. Keywords: AffectCategorizationEmotion Acknowledgements Preparation of this manuscript was supported by the National Institutes of Health Director's Pioneer Award (DP1OD003312), a National Institute of Mental Health's Independent Scientist Research Award (K02 MH001981), grants from the National Institute of Aging (AG030311) and the National Science Foundation (BCS 0721260; BCS 0527440), and a contract with the Army Research Institute (W91WAW). Notes Lisa Feldman Barrett is in the Department of Psychology at Boston College. She also has appointments in the Departments of Psychiatry and Radiology at the Massachusetts General Hospital/ Harvard Medical School. Maria Gendron is in the Department of Psychology at Boston College. Yang-Ming Huang is in the Department of Psychology at Indiana University. Additional informationNotes on contributorsLisa Feldman Barrett Lisa Feldman Barrett is in the Department of Psychology at Boston College. She also has appointments in the Departments of Psychiatry and Radiology at the Massachusetts General Hospital/ Harvard Medical School. Maria Gendron is in the Department of Psychology at Boston College. Yang-Ming Huang is in the Department of Psychology at Indiana University.