The Role of Values in Predicting Fairness Judgments and Support of Affirmative Action

Affirmative action is one of the most controversial current public policies—public support has never reached a majority of the electorate for most versions of affirmative action. Many people oppose affirmative action on the grounds that it violates norms of procedural fairness and meritocracy, in spite of the fact that they also support egalitarian values consistent with it. This article explores this apparent paradox by testing reactions to affirmative action in college admissions by comparing three models positing differing roles for values in ideological reasoning: (1) a central role for values—Tetlock's (1986) value pluralism model, (2) a secondary role for values—Lind's (1992) fairness heuristic hypothesis, and (3) no role for values—affective explanations (i.e., Jackman, 1978). Results support the fairness heuristic hypothesis—subjective assessments of fairness play a mediating role between personal values and support for affirmative action. These results indicate that values play a significant role in determining support for affirmative action. To more fully understand how people reason about affirmative action, however, values research must be yoked with justice research.