In this article, I argue that the meaning and use of r?int?gration, both as a concept and a postconflict peacebuilding practice, is overloaded and unclear, thus contributing to problematic policy responses and impeding accountability. I draw on the Liberian case to show how vague, platitudi nal, or contradictory understandings of r?int?gration can translate in the field to ad hoc and disengaged planning processes and programs that lack a clear strategy and lead to overblown expectations. I also contend that the ongoing securitization of r?int?gration can actually undermine both devel opmental and security objectives by instrumentalizing r?int?gration's orig inal, socioeconomic aims, at the same time that it engenders frustration aris ing from inflated and unfulfilled expectations. The article concludes with recommendations for improving the thinking, practice, and evaluation of r?int?gration. Keywords: disarmament, demobilization, and r?int?gration (DDR) programs, Liberia, postconflict, securitization, development. Disarmament, demobilization, and r?int?gration (DDR) programs are integral to international community interventions in postconflict coun tries. Yet DDR's effectiveness, particularly in reintegrating former fighters?the focus of this article?owes more to assumption than to evi dence. Assumptions?about how conflicts and affected societies are consti tuted and organized?also factor strongly into r?int?gration's conceptuali zation, which in turn tends to be so broad in scope and aims as to undermine chances of effective implementation. Relatedly and, I argue, problematically, r?int?gration operates in the service of two ends, security and development, not necessarily best served by the same means. Cumulatively, these ele ments?an oft-misguided basis for policy formulation combined with multiple
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Kathleen M. Jennings (2008) studied this question.
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