Internal Economic Resistance and the Prevention of Aggression: Behavioral Foundations, Measurement, and External Activation Mechanisms

This preprint develops the concept of internal economic resistance as a measurable and operational factor influencing the feasibility of aggression. The paper integrates behavioral economics, political decision theory, and the framework of Economic Guarantees of Security (EGS), treating domestic resistance as a latent constraint embedded in the decision-making process of political leadership. A key contribution is the introduction of a resistance index, designed to quantify internal constraints and incorporate them into models of deterrence. The paper also explores mechanisms for external activation of internal resistance through targeted economic instruments, including sanctions and financial triggers. The analysis builds on prospect theory and the asymmetric perception of losses and gains, demonstrating how internal costs can be amplified to alter strategic choices. The results contribute to a broader research program that conceptualizes peace as an engineered system, where economic mechanisms serve as automatic stabilizers in international security.