Abstract This paper advances the thesis that there is a substantive tension between the Non- Reductionist View of the Self , according to which the self is fundamental (irreducible to physical or psychological states or processes) and indivisible (not composed of parts), and the Block Universe Theory , which holds that all events and moments coexist within a four-dimensional reality. The paper develops this thesis by presenting two arguments: the Temporal Zombie Argument and the Epistemic Zombie Argument. The former argument contends that combining the Non-Reductionist View of the Self with the Block Universe Theory entails the existence of philosophical zombies, whereas the latter argument suggests that we could have lived our entire lives among such entities without realising it. If this line of reasoning is correct, non-reductionists cannot coherently adopt the Block Universe Theory as their temporal framework; conversely, block universe theorists cannot endorse the Non-Reductionist View of the Self without facing these problems.
Jean Campos (2026) studied this question.