Voting under complex rules: How selectivity and political sophistication shape vote congruence

For voting to contribute to democratic ends, citizens must vote congruently with their preferences. This requires not only acquiring information but also navigating the act of voting – especially under complex voting rules that present numerous options and sophisticated ballot tools. Drawing on an original large-scale experiment in the field, I provide novel insights into how an interplay of the institutional setting (complexity of voting rules), the supply side (degree of selectivity of congruence between ballot options and citizens' preferences), and individual characteristics (political sophistication) shapes vote congruence on an individual level. I demonstrate that, first, citizens on average vote more congruently under complex rules, providing evidence that they possess sufficient capacities to utilize enhanced voting tools effectively. Second, the more selectively citizens support the supplied ballot options, the more congruently they vote with complex rules. This suggests that in more diversified societies, where citizens’ preferences align less with distinct parties, complex rules likely have a stronger positive effect on vote congruence. Third, politically sophisticated voters utilize complex rules more effectively, likely due to the greater informational demands. These findings underscore that beyond acquiring and processing information, the act of voting itself is crucial for understanding the determinants of vote congruence. They also underscore how voting system design can either mitigate or reinforce inequalities, depending on the interplay of institutional and individual factors.