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April 25, 2026The Review of Corporate Finance Studies1 citations

Selectivity, Favoritism, and Performance: The Role of Investment Consultants in Private Equity

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JMJosé Vicente MartinezUniversity of ConnecticutYQYiming QianUniversity of Connecticut

Key Points

  • This research investigates how investment consultants affect the portfolio choices and performance of institutional asset owners in private equity.
  • Analyzed the relationship between consultants and investment choices using institutional asset owner data.
  • Examined performance outcomes based on consultants' focus and assets managed.
  • Identified mechanisms of consultants' impact on performance including access and selection abilities.
  • Asset owners using the same search consultant make similar investment choices.
  • Asset owners advised by consultants with a narrow focus on PE managers show better performance.
  • Top clients with larger PE mandates achieve superior investment outcomes.

Abstract

Abstract We examine the influence of consultants on the portfolio choices and performance of institutional asset owners’ private equity (PE) investments. We find that asset owners using the same search consultant make similar investment choices. Asset owners advised by consultants that focus on a narrower list of PE managers perform better. Among asset owners that share a consultant, those with the largest PE mandates (top clients) end up with better-performing investments. For mechanisms underlying consultants’ performance impact, we find evidence for both access and selection abilities.

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Cite This Study

Martinez et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69ec5a6b88ba6daa22dabf69https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfag014
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