War Decisions Under Risk Asymmetry: Why Deterrence Breaks Down

his preprint develops a decision-theoretic analysis of war choice under conditions of risk asymmetry. It demonstrates that classical deterrence frameworks fail when decision-makers systematically overweight low-probability high-impact gains and discount long-term losses. The paper integrates behavioral economics, expected utility theory, and political decision-making models to explain persistent deviations from rational deterrence equilibrium. The analysis introduces key control variables—time horizon, probability weighting, and perceived scale of outcomes—and shows how their manipulation affects strategic choices. A central result is the identification of structural incompleteness in deterrence systems: even with high expected costs, war may remain a rational choice under asymmetric perception. The paper concludes by proposing the introduction of guaranteed benefits of peace as a necessary complement to deterrence, forming a basis for future work within the Economic Guarantees of Security (EGS) framework.