A Motivational Approach to the Paradox of Fiction

This paper reevaluates Walton’s and Radford’s claims about fiction-directed emotions by proposing to interpret their arguments through a motivational theory of emotion, rather than the cognitive framework typically employed. I first demonstrate that no cognitive theory justifies their conclusions. I then argue that a motivational account can alternatively support either Radford’s or Walton’s position, depending on whether we accept that emotions toward fiction involve action tendencies, as ordinary emotions do. If they do, the motivational theory justifies Radford’s claim about the irrationality of fiction-directed emotions. If, by contrast, we deny that emotions for fiction involve readiness for action, the motivational account favors Walton’s view of quasi-emotions. After developing this line of argument, I revisit textual evidence from Radford’s and Walton’s works that aligns with my interpretation.