Biosecurity in the age of synthetic nucleic acids: modernizing the law to manage emerging threats

The rapid expansion of synthetic biology has transformed research and innovation but has also created profound biosecurity challenges. Synthetic nucleic acid (SNA) technologies, which allow genetic material to be synthetically created, enable scientific progress but also lower the barriers to constructing or enhancing dangerous pathogens. This article argues that the governance of SNA should be grounded in a transnational new governance approach that combines binding international obligations with harmonized technical standards. It assesses the fitness of current regimes—the International Health Regulations, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, and national biosecurity laws—and finds that while these instruments already impose binding obligations to prevent misuse of biological agents, their terms remain outdated and their application fragmented. Most states lack explicit SNA order screening requirements, and voluntary private standards such as those of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium and ISO 20688-2 remain inadequate for managing this global risk. The article recommends modernizing international law by clarifying that existing treaties cover synthetic biology, developing harmonized global screening standards, and updating national legislation to mandate and incentivize SNA order screening. It further proposes leveraging market access and funding power to drive global practice. Ultimately, safeguarding innovation in the age of SNA requires aligning law to manage the risks of emerging biotechnologies.