Game-Theoretic Perspectives on the Optimal Design and Control of Power Electronic Systems

Power electronic systems are often engineered through a sequential–iterative workflow in which hardware parameters are initially sized from steady-state, ripple, thermal, and electromagnetic-compatibility constraints, and controllers are subsequently tuned to satisfy dynamic and closed-loop performance requirements. While converters are inherently designed for closed-loop operation, increasing power density, uncertainty, and distributed interaction make the underlying design process resemble a strategic interplay among multiple decision-makers, including hardware designers, control algorithms, loads, disturbances, and manufacturing constraints. This paper develops a unifying game-theoretic perspective on the optimal design and control of power electronic systems. Classical concepts—such as robust control, worst-case design, droop-based load sharing, and tolerance allocation—are reinterpreted as equilibrium solutions of zero-sum, Stackelberg, non-cooperative, or cooperative games. Beyond a conceptual taxonomy, two illustrative simulation case studies are provided: (i) a Stackelberg hardware–controller co-design of a buck converter, demonstrating simultaneous passive-component reduction and improved transient performance relative to a conservative sequential design; and (ii) a droop-controlled parallel-converter example contrasting Nash and cooperative equilibria, explicitly quantifying trade-offs between bus-voltage regulation, current-sharing fairness, and conduction losses. By framing power electronic design and control as interacting strategic processes rather than isolated optimization stages, the paper aims to show that game theory can serve as a structured and practically interpretable framework for distributed and uncertainty-aware power electronic systems.