In the current context, classic software licensing and protection mechanisms based exclusively on host application checks can be circumvented by patching, emulation and replay attacks in user-controlled environments. This paper presents an adaptive hardware key implemented on the ESP32-S3 platform, which externalizes sensitive decisions and cryptographic operations from the host application to a dedicated device. The solution combines a device-anchored root of trust (secure boot and flash memory encryption), a PKI-verifiable identity (Public Key Infrastructure X.509 certificate and digital signatures as proof of ownership), hierarchical key derivation to avoid static secrets and the establishment of an authenticated encrypted session for all essential data exchanges. User access is conditioned by three-factor authentication (PIN—Personal Identification Number, TOTP—Time based One Time Password and USB physical presence) and a “code-in-dongle” mechanism, in which the important logic runs on the device and the application receives tokens with limited duration. Experimental validation demonstrates correct provisioning, secure session establishment, negative brute-force testing, as well as lifecycle support via signed OTA (Over-The-Air) with anti-rollback and encrypted backup/recovery. Build reports indicate a balanced flash distribution and available DIRAM (Data/Instruction RAM) margin, while IRAM (Instruction RAM) saturation (99.99%) reflects a normal architectural behavior of the ESP32-S3 unified memory model rather than a capacity constraint.
Popovici et al. (2026) studied this question.
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