Decentralized Finance (DeFi) signifies not just a technological advancement but a profound transformation in financial governance, shifting power from traditional hierarchical intermediaries to autonomous, self-executing code. This article, grounded in institutional economics and legal theory, posits that DeFi introduces a novel governance framework in which trust is embedded in deterministic protocols rather than vested in individuals or institutions. By examining the four fundamental DeFi primitives—decentralized exchanges, lending platforms, programmable derivatives, and automated financial operations—we illustrate how programmable rules disintermediate conventional fiduciary responsibilities and enforcement mechanisms. A detailed case study of Compound’s governance evolution highlights both the potential for increased efficiency and the rise of new accountability challenges. We identify a critical tension: while automated rule enforcement minimizes transaction costs and mitigates principal-agent issues, it concurrently diminishes contestability, adaptability, and avenues for redress—elements vital for robust financial systems. The article concludes by proposing a hybrid governance framework that retains the efficiency of code while reintroducing deliberative safeguards, providing pathways for regulators, protocol developers, and scholars to navigate the re-integration of finance in a post-intermediary landscape.
Nzomiwu et al. (Mon,) studied this question.