ABSTRACT According to most readers of the Tractatus , Wittgenstein's logic is empty or contentless, since it consists of tautologies that do not picture reality. This view, however, does not explain how and why Wittgenstein's ‘logic of depiction’ is transcendental (T, 4.015 and 6.13), especially given that Kant introduced transcendental logic through the notion of content. In this paper, I propose a transcendental interpretation of Wittgenstein's logic, as logic of depiction. On this view, Wittgenstein's logic has a transcendental content , namely the formal rules of combination internal to the subject's speech about objects. In fact, I argue that there are two interrelated pillars of Wittgenstein's transcendental logic: isomorphism , whereby objects constitute the common form of language and reality, and intentionality , as our capacity to pictorially relate to objects in language. Tautologies turn out to be dispensable by‐products of pictures and, thus, of the transcendental (i.e., content‐endowed) logic of depiction. The result is a reconception of Wittgenstein's logic, grounded in a systematic comparison with Kant.
Simone Nota (Tue,) studied this question.