Integrating evolutionary game theory with SEIRS models: A spatial epidemic simulator for strategy-based interventions.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: This study investigates how adaptive individual behavior influences epidemic dynamics in spatially structured populations. Specifically, it examines how payoff-driven strategy evolution interacts with spatial SEIRS dynamics to shape epidemic outcomes. METHODS: We construct a simulation framework that integrates a spatial SEIRS epidemic model with evolutionary game dynamics based on a Hawk-Dove formulation of behavioral strategies, including vaccination and freeriding. Strategies evolve through payoff-driven adaptation driven by local interactions, while disease transmission follows spatially localized SEIRS dynamics on a two-dimensional lattice. All core scenarios were repeated N=15 times with independent random seeds; results are reported as mean ± standard deviation (SD) with 95% confidence intervals. RESULTS: ≈0.2-0.5, beyond which epidemic duration approaches the full simulation window regardless of transmission rate. CONCLUSIONS: The framework reveals key feedbacks between individual decision-making and epidemic spread, highlighting the limitations of voluntary vaccination in the presence of permanent non-compliant agents and low perceived infection risk.