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Investigates the effects of complexity in managerial communication on shareholder decision making in Slovenia, suggesting that excessive complexity hampers transparency.
This study investigates how managers communicate with shareholders, balancing impartiality and transparency against their vested interests. We examine management communication behaviour through the lens of information asymmetry in Slovenia, exploring how information overload and complexity in disclosures may influence shareholder decision making. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with top managers and a textual readability analysis of annual report letters to shareholders, we find that managers often introduce high levels of complexity in communications, sometimes deliberately, to safeguard their own interests. This observed ‘complexity effect’ provides new insight into information asymmetries in modern organizations, highlighting how excessive complexity can undermine transparent and effective shareholder communication.
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Žvipelj et al. (2026) studied this question.
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