Guardian Security: A Formal Threat Model and Defense Framework for Wireless Energy Systems

Wireless energy routing introduces a class of security vulnerabilities that has no analog in data networking: a successful attack on a wireless power system does not corrupt data — it corrupts physics. Beam hijacking misdirects RF energy to unintended targets. Denial-of-power attacks starve critical devices. Localization spoofing causes a beam to strike a biological target rather than an electronic one. The consequences of these attacks are not data loss or service disruption — they are equipment damage, fire, and physical injury. No formal security framework for wireless energy routing has previously been published. This paper provides one. I define the complete attack surface for a deterministic wireless energy routing system, derive eleven threat categories from first principles, and specify the Guardian Security defense framework — the security enforcement layer implemented in the Meridian architecture — as a formal, auditable response to each threat. Guardian Security (energy-domain designation: Guardian-E; commercial product domain: TrustShield.tech) implements two-tier defense: an innate tier providing immediate, non-specific response to anomalous conditions, and an adaptive tier providing learned, specific response to classified threat patterns. I derive the Guardian Security rule set from the formal attack surface definition rather than from enumerated known attacks, ensuring that the defense covers the complete threat space rather than only previously observed threats. I prove coverage completeness by demonstrating that every path from attacker to system compromise requires traversal of at least one Guardian Security enforcement boundary. I show that Guardian Security satisfies four formal security properties: authenticity (every participant is who they claim to be), integrity (no resource flow is modified in transit without detection), availability (the system continues operating under attack, with degraded but bounded service), and non-repudiation (every resource delivery event is attributable to a specific authenticated participant). This paper establishes the security foundation for both the single-mesh Meridian architecture and the multi-mesh Energy Internet. It proposes Guardian Security as the reference security architecture for all future Deterministic Infrastructure deployments. Keywords: wireless energy security, threat model, formal security analysis, Guardian Security, denial-of-power, beam hijacking, localization spoofing, Meridian, TrustShield, deterministic infrastructure security, wireless power transfer security Protected under U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 64/032,339, Filed April 7, 2026.