Between Person and Technological Artifact: Social Robot in the Light of Karol Wojtyła’s Personalism

This article examines the attribution of personal characteristics to social robots from the perspective of John Paul II’s personalism. It addresses two research questions: (1) How are social robots – as technological artifacts – conceptualized within Karol Wojtyła’s personalist framework? and (2) To what extent is the attribution of personal characteristics to social robots compatible with the principles of Wojtyła’s personalism? The analysis is conducted within the frameworks of actor-network theory, Media as Social Actors, human-machine communication, and human-robot interaction. Four research hypotheses are proposed and supported by the findings. The results confirm that, from a personalist perspective, social robots remain technological artifacts rather than persons, as they lack intrinsic subjectivity: suppositum , moral agency, personal dignity, and the unity of body and spirit. Furthermore, the attribution of personal traits to robots reflects functional, simulated, or perceptual processes rather than genuine personhood. Although social robots may mediate or facilitate interpersonal relations, they cannot participate in authentic personal communion. Consequently, perceiving robots as social or quasi-personal actors constitutes a relational and perceptual phenomenon rather than an ontological transformation. The article adopts an analytic-descriptive approach and is grounded within the social sciences. Issues related to the notion of the soul are deliberately excluded from the scope of the analysis.