Artificial Intelligence, the Theory of Obligations and the Analogical Use of the Roman Servus Institution

This article analyzes the legal challenges posed by artificial intelligence (AI) within the framework of general contract law, given that it lacks the essential characteristic required for the attribution of liability: the will, which is inherently human. Following the jurist Dr. Carlos Amunátegui Perelló, the solution to this difficulty is proposed to be the analogous application of the status of the Roman slave, which would allow for the easy regulation of contemporary artificial agents. Various Roman institutions are examined, such as the actiones adiectitiae qualitatis (actio quod iussum, exercitoria, institoria), noxal actions, the actio de pauperie, the peculium, and the actio in rem verso, all of which aim to establish contractual and extracontractual liability for the actions of entities lacking legal personality, with the goal of analogously applying these concepts to artificial agents—entities that can make decisions while being things and lacking the attributes of personality, and thus, ultimately, not being persons. Thus, it is concluded that an analogical use to the Roman servus is necessary in order to integrate AI into the theory of obligations in an organic and efficient manner, while respecting the ontological limits of human personhood, without fictitiously attributing solutions or assumptions incompatible with the artificial agent’s status as a thing.