In dual-channel supply chains (DCSC), where firms operate both online and offline channels, traditional pricing and coordination models typically adopt fixed rebate structures. However, the interaction between consumer channel preference and platform rebate policies remains underexplored, leaving a gap in understanding their combined impact on pricing and coordination decisions. To address this issue, this study develops a Stackelberg game model to examine how consumer behavior and rebate flexibility jointly influence the strategic decisions of manufacturers, retailers, and platforms. Numerical simulations are further conducted to evaluate different consumer channel preference intensities and rebate adjustment scenarios. The results indicate that a stronger offline channel preference increases wholesale and retail prices, rebate levels, and retailer effort. Under manufacturer-led structures, consumers bear higher costs compared with centralized coordination, while in decentralized systems, flexible rebates play a crucial role in shaping profits and overall efficiency. The novelty of this research lies in integrating platform rebate mechanisms into the DCSC framework, providing new insights into how consumer channel preference drive pricing and coordination outcomes. Practically, the findings offer guidance for e-commerce supply chain managers to align rebate strategies with consumer behavior, thereby enhancing both strategic alignment and operational performance.
Zhang et al. (Fri,) studied this question.