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May 14, 2026Journal of Mathematical EconomicsOpen Access

Maximal matchings

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Authors

ATAnh TriêuMaastricht UniversityIBIwan BosMaastricht UniversityMSMarc SchröderMaastricht University

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Overview

Randomized trial demonstrates a new mechanism to maximize transactions in markets, indicating potential for effective policymaking.

Key Points

  • This research aims to develop a mechanism that maximizes the number of transactions in markets with bilateral transactions.
  • Proposed a mechanism that implements maximal matching for bilateral transactions.
  • Ensured the mechanism is incentive compatible.
  • Analyzed the mechanism's need for external funding similar to the VCG-mechanism.
  • The presented mechanism effectively achieved maximal matchings in theorized conditions.
  • Demonstrated compatibility with existing incentive structures, enhancing transaction efficiency.

Cite This Study

Triêu et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a05659da550a87e60a1dfb0https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103254
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