Scientific Discovery by Computer as Empirical Refutation of the Strong Programme

In his manifesto for the `strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), David Bloor expressed its diametric opposition to the `mentalist' or `teleological' model of `rationalist' philosophers, saying that `there can be no doubt that if the teleological model is true then the strong programme is false'. The `teleological' point of view can be seen embodied in the mentalism of contemporary interdisciplinary research under the heading of `cognitive science', and particularly in computer models of artificial intelligence (AI). In this sense, the enterprise of cognitive science, encompassing psychology, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience and AI constitutes a massive empirical challenge to SSK's claims for the social causation of belief. Of particular interest is the AI work on scientific discovery as a special case of heuristic problem solving: the possibility of computers autonomously making fundamental scientific discoveries is providing dramatic confirmation of the `teleological' view that there are principles of rationality and a `scientific method' which are independent of social factors.