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User-side shared energy storage (uSES) is pivotal for optimizing power consumption and enhancing grid flexibility. This study proposes a multi-period equilibrium model for a power supply chain network (PSCN) that incorporates power generators, suppliers, uSES operators, and demand markets. Within a multi-level network equilibrium framework, the model formulates the non-cooperative, profit-driven interactions among these stakeholders to analyze the synergy of diverse uSES revenue streams. Four distinct uSES revenue scenarios are analyzed: (1) peak-valley arbitrage (PV-Arb) combined with demand management (DM); (2) PV-Arb combined with valley-filling demand response (vDR) subsidies; (3) PV-Arb combined with peak-shaving demand response (pDR) subsidies; and (4) an integration incorporating PV-Arb, DM, and pDR subsidies. The results demonstrate that although participation in vDR or pDR may marginally reduce PV-Arb revenues, the associated subsidy incentives can fully compensate for these losses. Crucially, the study finds that a synergistic strategy combining PV-Arb, DM, and DR yields superior profitability for uSES operators compared to any single or dual revenue mechanisms. Furthermore, it highlights that neglecting DM on days with pDR participation can lead to increased demand charges, thereby diminishing overall returns. These findings provide valuable insights for uSES operators in optimizing revenue strategies and for policymakers in designing effective incentive mechanisms.
Zhang et al. (Sat,) studied this question.