The Entanglement Problem for Psychological Hylomorphism

The theory of psychological hylomorphism has recently been advanced by David Charles as a viable alternative to physicalist and dualist theories of mind. According to Charles, a human or animal is a psycho-physical whole whose mental and physical properties are defined with reference to the whole. This is because it is a hylomorphic composite of matter and form, where the form contains the material principles of the composite in its definition. In this paper, we raise a difficulty concerning the individuation of forms in light of the quantum theory of matter, asking whether the phenomenon of quantum entanglement gives us reason to doubt that the micro-physical properties of a human or animal derive (solely) from the psycho-physical properties of a middle-sized whole. We suggest several ways of amending the theory of psychological hylomorphism to accommodate entanglement, including a proposal by Simpson, in which the cosmos counts as a psycho-physical whole, and a proposal by Koons, in which distinct substances share a ‘group form.’