Part 1 The mind-body problem - where we now are: supervenience, realization and emergence supervenience is not a mind-body theory the layered model and mereological supervenience physical realization physical realization explains mind-body supervenience. Part 2 The many problems of mental causation: three problems of mental causation the supervenience argument, or Descartes's revenge Searle, Fodor and the supervenience argument Block's worries about second-order properties. Part 3 Mental causation - the backlash and free lunches: unavoidability of metaphysics - the exclusion problem do counterfactuals help? programme explanation and supervenient causation does the problem of mental causation generalize? properties - levels and orders. Part 4 Reduction and reductionism - a new look: Nagel reduction - troubles with bridge laws the functional model of reduction functional properties versus functional concepts multiple realization again the supervenience argument revisited the options - good news and bad news.
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A 1999 study studied this question.