What does this research mean for the field?

Despite a multi-layered statutory framework governing investigation duties in the Dutch financial sector, there are significant gaps in follow-up and substantive effectiveness regarding its implementation. Novelty: ClaimNovelty.SYNTHESIS. Consensus alignment: ConsensusAlignment.NEUTRAL.

What question did this study set out to answer?

This research investigates the effectiveness of the duty to investigate within Dutch financial sector reporting frameworks and identifies existing gaps.

May 19, 20260 citationsOpen Access

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The" Onderzoeksplicht" Paradox: Statutory Duty to Investigate, Documented Follow-Up Gaps, and the Financial-Sector Reporting-Investigation Architecture in Dutch Implementation of EU AML and Whistleblower Frameworks — A PRISMA Systematic Review and Mixed-Methods Evidence Synthesis of Wwft Article 23, AMLD Article 38, Directive (EU) 2024/1640 Article 60, and DNB / AFM / FIU-Nederland Supervisory Practice (2015–2026)

DBDavid Adam Dr BraimerIonian University

Key Points

This research investigates the effectiveness of the duty to investigate within Dutch financial sector reporting frameworks and identifies existing gaps.
Conducted a systematic review based on PRISMA guidelines to assess statutory duties across various directives.
Analyzed mixed-methods data from supervisory practices of DNB, AFM, and FIU-Nederland.
Reviewed the impact of relevant legislative articles from 2015 to 2026.
Significant deficiencies in the assessment of the effectiveness of investigative activities were documented.
Gaps in the implementation of statutory duties to investigate were highlighted, particularly regarding internal reporting safeguards.
The audit by Algemene Rekenkamer revealed inadequate enforcement tracking by supervisory bodies.

Abstract

The Dutch financial sector operates under a multi-layered statutory framework of duties to investigate. Article 23 of the Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme (Wwft) requires obliged entities to investigate suspicious-transaction indicators and to report unusual transactions to FIU-Nederland. Article 38 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 (AMLD 4) imposes corresponding investigation duties on obliged entities including a duty to ensure that internal reporting persons are not subject to threats or retaliation. The Wet op het financieel toezicht (Wft) imposes prudential and conduct-of-business duties on financial institutions including duties to investigate operational deficiencies. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) as prudential supervisor, the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) as conduct supervisor, and FIU-Nederland as financial intelligence unit hold supervisory and investigative competences. Cluster B Article B-1 documented the Algemene Rekenkamer 2026 audit finding that the central enforcement bodies do not assess the effectiveness of their own activity. Article 60 of Directive (EU) 2024/1640 (the recast Sixth AML Directive, transposition deadline 10 July 2027) extends specific whistleblower-investigation duties into the financial-sector AML domain. Despite the layered statutory framework, the documentary record raises questions concerning the substantive effectiveness of Dutch financial-sector duty-to-investigate implementation.

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