Two at one blow? The EU and its quest for security and democracy by political conditionality in the Western Balkans

The EU is facing a serious conflict of objectives in the Western Balkans, primarily between security interests calling for the rapid integration of these countries and its interest in democratization, which demands a stricter democracy promotion agenda and cautions against a rushed enlargement round including unconsolidated states. I argue that the EU's approach, which enforces both security and democracy through one instrument, namely, political conditionality, has yielded only limited success and has contributed to the emergence of a conflict of objectives for a number of reasons. First, to render its conditionality policy credible and consistent, the EU has been forced to prioritize security at the expense of democracy promotion. Second, compliance patterns in the two areas have differed, resulting in a conditionality dilemma that forces the EU to sanction compliance or reward non-compliance. And third, the use of political conditionality in security issues has generated counterproductive side effects that may impede the consolidation of democracy. The case study of Macedonia empirically supports this argument. The study provides evidence for an argument that contradicts much of the literature on sequencing: democracy promotion should resume playing a significant role in the early stages of post-conflict transition. Keywords: democracy promotionEuropean UnionenlargementconditionalityWestern BalkansMacedonia Acknowledgements I am grateful for comments on earlier versions provided by the three editors of this issue, Sonja Grimm, Julia Leininger, and Tina Freyburg, as well as by Jörg Faust, by the participants of the workshop on the special issue in Zürich 2011, and by the two anonymous referees. Notes In line with this special issue, the term 'democracy promotion' includes all peaceful measures by external actors intended to support or even speed up the political transformation to democracy in a target country. For simplicity, the terms 'democratization (process)', 'transformation (process)', and 'transition' can also be used synonymously as umbrella terms for the process of regime change. A differentiation between these terms would only make sense based on extensive discussion, which is not feasible within the confines of this article. Wolff, 'Theorie des Demokratischen Friedens'; Grävingholt, Leininger, and Schlumberger, 'Demokratieförderung'. The EU coined the term 'Western Balkans'. With the exception of Slovenia, the Western Balkans consist of all of the former Yugoslavian states plus Albania. The Copenhagen criteria for candidate countries additionally demand a functioning market economy with a capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Moreover, the respective states are to have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. See European Council, 'Copenhagen'. Kochenov, 'Behind the Copenhagen Façade'. Take as an example the 2011 progress reports and the EU's enlargement strategy, which can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_oct_2011_en.htm (accessed November 15, 2011). Noutcheva, 'Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance', 1069. See Richter, 'Frieden schaffen', 78. Risse-Kappen, 'Democratic Peace'; Sandschneider, 'Externe Demokratieförderung', 17–18. Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 45. Ohlson and Söderberg, 'From Intrastate-war', 3; Mansfield and Snyder, 'Democratic Transition', 299ff.; Gurr, People versus State, 85. Geis and Wagner, 'How Far is it from Königsberg to Kandahar?'; Carothers, 'The Backlash'. Wolff, 'Theorie des Demokratischen Friedens'. Linz and Stepan, Democratic Transition, 16; on the sequencing debate, see the articles in the 'Exchange' section of Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3 (2007). Börzel argues in a similar way: Börzel, 'When Europeanization Hits Limited Statehood'. On intrinsic and extrinsic conflicts of objectives, see Grimm and Leininger, 'Not All Good Things Go Together'; Spanger and Wolff, 'Universales Ziel'. The constitutional name of the country is 'Republic of Macedonia' (Republika Makedonija). Due to an unresolved name dispute with neighbouring Greece, the country is still officially a member of the United Nations under the name 'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' (FYROM). In this article, the name Macedonia is used, as it is standard in the academic literature. Cf. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 'EU Democracy Promotion'; Kelley, 'International Actors on the Domestic Scene'. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 'EU Democracy Promotion', 894. Schimmelfennig, 'EU Political Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement', 920; see also Börzel, 'When Europeanization Hits Limited Statehood'; Kelley, 'International Actors on the Domestic Scene'; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 'EU Democracy Promotion'; Richter 'Fluch oder Segen'; Vachudova, Europe Undivided. This scheme is often used in the framework of the result-based management approach for measuring the effectiveness of democracy and governance assistance; cf. Crawford and Kearton, Evaluating Democracy and Governance Assistance. Here and in the following: Rittberger and Zangl, 'Internationale Organisationen', 159; Beisheim, Liese, and Ulbert, 'Transnationale öffentlich-private Partnerschaften', 4. Schimmelfennig, 'EU Political Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement'; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 'EU Democracy Promotion'; Kelley, 'International Actors on the Domestic Scene'. For a ground-breaking work see: Anderson, Do No Harm; see also Crawford and Kearton, Evaluating Democracy and Governance Assistance; Cracknell, Evaluating Development Aid; cf. Underdal and Young, 'Research Strategies'. For example, Jacoby, 'The Priest and the Penitent'; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 'Introduction'; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 'Conclusion'. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 'EU Democracy Promotion', 893–4. Trauner, 'From Membership Conditionality', 774–8. Schimmelfennig, 'Europeanization beyond Europe', 15–8; Warkotsch, 'Non-compliance'. Schimmelfennig, 'Europeanization beyond Europe', 15. Youngs, 'Normative Dynamics', 431. Knodt and Jünemann, 'Introduction', 19. This argumentation stands in contrast to one of the few studies on consistency in the remaining (potential) EU candidate countries, among them the Western Balkans. Schimmelfennig argues that 'the EU's political accession conditionality has been normatively consistent on the whole', that is, that standards remained the same in enlargement decisions; Schimmelfennig, 'EU Political Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement', 927. However, this conclusion could only have been drawn by the author by subsuming the SAP criteria (such as cooperation with the ICTY) under the overall objective of democracy promotion, thus neglecting the special security dimension of these criteria. Since the outcome of political conditionality in security and in democratization issues must be explained by two different logics of social action (that is, two causal mechanisms), this requires an analytical distinction. Schimmelfennig, 'Europeanization beyond Europe', 9, 16–20. Other than Slovenia, Croatia remained the only SEE country that had started accession negotiations by 2005 (finishing in 2011). By 2009, the European Commission had recommended the opening of negotiations with Macedonia, but the European Council has not yet reached a decision, due to the threat of a Greek veto. Wolff, 'Theorie des Demokratischen Friedens'. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 'Introduction'; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 'EU Democracy Promotion'. Checkel, 'International Institutions', 809; cf. March and Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics', 948–54. Schimmelfennig, 'Europäisierung in Osteuropa'. Zürn and Checkel, 'Getting Socialized', 1064. On the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness see March and Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics', 948–54. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 'EU Democracy Promotion', 890. A third model called the 'lessons drawing' model combines the two logics, arguing that governments adopt EU rules if they perceive them as solutions to their problems, either based on instrumental calculations or on the appropriateness of the EU solutions, Schimmelfennig, 'Europeanization beyond Europe', 8. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 'Conclusion'; for an overview, see Schimmelfennig, 'Europeanization beyond Europe', 9; Trauner, 'From Membership Conditionality', 777; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 'EU Democracy Promotion', 894; Kelley, 'International Actors on the Domestic Scene'. Kelley, 'International Actors on the Domestic Scene', 426. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 'EU Democracy Promotion', 893–5. For the two logics of action, see March and Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics', 948–54. Schimmelfennig follows a different line of reasoning; he argues that 'issues of national identity related to ethnic conflicts potentially cause high political costs to any government'; Schimmelfennig, 'EU Political Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement', 928. Freyburg and Richter, 'National Identity', 267. Ibid., 263. Noutcheva, 'Fake, Partial, and Imposed Compliance', 1066. Ibid., 1074. For example, Kelley, 'International Actors on the Domestic Scene'; Schimmelfennig, 'Europäisierung in Osteuropa'; Schimmelfennig, 'EU Political Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement'. Kneuer, 'Der Einfluß externer Faktoren', 242. Cf. Burnell, 'The State of the Discourse', 27; Schimmelfennig, 'Europäisierung in Osteuropa', 324. Zürn and Checkel, 'Getting Socialized', 1064. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 'Introduction', 11. Checkel, 'International Institutions', 809. Kelley, 'International Actors on the Domestic Scene', 426. Pridham, 'EU Enlargement'; Vachudova, 'The Leverage of International Institutions', 5; Pravda, 'Introduction', 19. Chayes and Chayes, 'On Compliance', 179; Pevehouse, Democracy from Above, 29. Ethier, 'Is Democracy Promotion Effective?', 100. Linden, 'Conclusion', 375. Pridham, 'EU Enlargement'. Kelley, 'International Actors – Domestic Effects', 12. Pridham, 'EU Enlargement', 969; Vachudova, 'The Leverage of International Institutions', 24; Vachudova, Europe Undivided. An overview of EU policy is provided by Blockmans, Tough Love. Semi-consolidated democracies are, by Freedom House's definition, 'electoral democracies that meet relatively high standards for the selection of national leaders but exhibit some weaknesses in their defense of political rights and civil liberties'. Transitional or hybrid regimes are 'typically electoral democracies that meet only minimum standards for the selection of national leaders. Democratic institutions are fragile and substantial challenges to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist. The potential for sustainable, liberal democracy is unclear.' Semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes 'attempt to mask authoritarianism or rely on external power structures with limited respect for the institutions and practices of democracy. They typically fail to meet even the minimum standards of electoral democracy', Freedom House, 'Nations in Transit 2011 Methodology'. Gromes, 'Between Impositions and Promises', 1, 4. The NLA is also known as the Macedonian UÇK – Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare. It was founded at the end of the 1990s by Ali Ahmeti, who in 2001 formed the Albanian political party Democratic Union of Integration, DUI, which can largely be considered the successor to the NLA; Gromes, 'Between Impositions and Promises', 12. The text of the Ohrid Framework Agreement can be found on the homepage of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL%282001%29104-e.asp (accessed January 25, 2012). See Willemsen, 'Das politische System Makedoniens'. United Nations Development Programme, 'People-centred Analyses Report 2009', 63. Vetterlein, Konfliktregulierung, 238. Socijaldemokratski Sojuz na Makedonija (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia). United Nations Development Programme, 'People-centred Analyses Report 2010', 68. In the following analysis, the name dispute is only integrated as far as the EU's conditionality policy is concerned. A detailed explanation and elaboration of its impact on Macedonian society would go beyond the scope of this article; for the name dispute, see ICG, 'Macedonia's Name'. See Vetterlein, 'Bildungspolitik'; Latifi, 'Preventive Engagement', 34. ICG, 'Macedonia's Name'. For example, Constitutional Amendements 2001, Law on Local Self-Government 2002. European Union, Council Decision of 30 January 2006. European Union, Council Decision of 18 February 2008. European Commission, 'Progress Report 2011'. The leverage of the United States was also crucial; Chivvis, 'The Making of Macedonia', 152f. Demokratska unija za integracija, in Albanian: Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim (Democratic Union for Integration). In 2004, the then opposition party VMRO-DPMNE narrowly failed to bring a referendum on the decentralization process that could have brought the entire OFA process to a stalemate. See Reka, 'The Ohrid Agreement', 62. Quote taken from Sebastian, 'The Stabilisation and Association Process', 6. Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija – Demokratska Partija na Makedonija za Nacionalno Edinstvo (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity). United Nations Development Programme, 'People-centred Analyses Report 2009', 53. ICG, 'Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict', i. Ibid. ICG, 'Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict'. On endgames see Schimmelfennig, 'EU Political Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement', 921. OSCE/ODIHR, 'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Presidential and Municipal Elections'; ICG, 'Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict'. Trauner, 'From Membership Conditionality'. The situation worsened with regard to the freedom of the press. For example, many lawsuits were filed by politicians against journalists in 2010, and the government's spending on advertising further threatened media independence; Milevska-Kostova, 'Macedonia', 353; ICG, 'Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict', 2; Gromes, 'Between Impositions and Promises', 18. Bieber, 'Power-sharing'; Reka, 'The Ohrid Agreement'; Taleski, 'Minderheiten und Mehrheiten', 271. Hensell, 'Typisch Balkan?', 142. Vetterlein, Konfliktregulierung, 211. Ibid., 236, 240. Ibid., 204, 209. Hensell, 'Typisch Balkan?', 142. Opfer-Klinger, 'Mazedonien zwischen äußerer Stabilisierung und innerer Krise', 29. Vetterlein, Konfliktregulierung, 208–14, 236. Taleski, 'Minderheiten und Mehrheiten', 271; Vetterlein, Konfliktregulierung, 205. Latifi, 'Preventive Engagement of the International Community', 33; Reka, 'The Ohrid Agreement', 69. Vetterlein, Konfliktregulierung, 239. Cf. Noutcheva, 'Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance', 1075. In a similar vein, see Zakošek, 'Democratization, State-building and War', 589. On Eastern Europe: Schimmelfennig, 'Europäisierung in Osteuropa'; Pridham, 'EU Enlargement'; Vachudova, Europe Undivided. For a similar argument, see Grävingholt, Leininger, and Schlumberger, 'Demokratieförderung: Kein Ende der Geschichte'.