Thin markets and thick networks: Social and street capital in New York City's underground gun market

Abstract This study analyzes New York City's underground gun market based on 92 in‐depth interviews with participants from high‐violence Brooklyn and Bronx neighborhoods directly involved in firearm acquisition and circulation. Despite aggressive enforcement and strict gun laws, illicit firearms continue to circulate in disadvantaged neighborhoods where shootings remain concentrated. We identify a structure characterized by “thin markets and thick networks,” where firearms circulate through dense social connections despite limited transaction volume and restricted participation. Our analysis illustrates how a dual capital framework—distinguishing social capital (trusted relationships) from street capital (reputation and specialized knowledge)—explains stratified access and transaction outcomes. These dynamics demonstrate how markets persist under constraint through adaptive mechanisms: network dependence, capital requirements, and trust‐based verification limit scale while simultaneously enabling circulation in the absence of organizational solutions. The findings extend economic and criminological accounts by specifying social mechanisms through which theoretically predicted market features—thinness, rationing, and trust‐based exchange—manifest in practice.