Epistemology of mental disorders: A transversal perspective from naturalistic and constructivist metaphysics and the pragmatic approach

Can we affirm that the current nosologies for mental disorders are accurate? In this paper, I present a concise epistemological review related to mental disorders and their conceptualization from three positions within the philosophy of mind. First, I address the naturalistic approach, delving into Szasz’s eliminativist view, Boorse’s biostatistical account, and the Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction, while also highlighting main challenges to this approach. Second, I analyze the constructivist approach and the arguments provided to critique and oppose the naturalistic perspective, as well as pointing out its weaknesses. Third, I outline the pragmatic approach, whose considerations help transcend the dialectic and confrontations between naturalistic reductionism and sociocultural constructivism. Lastly, I summarize the main conclusions and directly respond to the primary question of this paper.