Toward a Redefinition of Action Theory: Paying the Cognitive Element Its Due

By means of an examination and a revision of Parsons's "action frame work," this paper offers to mediate the debate between Parsons and the critics of his Durkheim-Weber "convergence" thesis and to present a more satisfactory rendering of Durkheim-Weber continuities. First, Parsons's Structure of Social Action is scrutinized. It is shown that Parsons so construes Hobbes that the "problem of order" for social theory is answered by the concept of internalized normative motivation. As a consequence of this focus, Parsons derogates an analytically independent "cognitive" element in action and elegates cognitive matters either to the "scientific" or "normative" orientations. Second, the interrelated series of articles by Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg are shown to rest on framework assumptions similar to Parsons's own, while drawing nearly opposite conclusions, rendering Durkheim a "positivist" and Weber a "utilitarian" in Parsons's sense of these terms. Third, a "redefined theory of action" is proposed which acknowledges explicitly the analytically independent role of the cognitive element in action. Some course-of-action statements drawn from Durkheim and Weber and focusing on the cognitive structuring of the "situation" and of "end" are presented and shown to involve compatible reasoning. Some implications are suggested.