The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness

Machines can be conscious, is the claim to be adopted here, upon examination of its different versions. We distinguish three kinds of consciousness: functional, phenomenal and hard consciousness (f-, p- and h-consciousness). Robots are functionally conscious already. There is also a clear project in AI on how to make computers phenomenally conscious, though criteria differ. Discussion about p-consciousness is clouded by the lack of clarity on its two versions: (1) First-person functional elements (here, p-consciousness), and (2) Non-functional (h-consciousness). I argue that: (1) There are sufficient reasons to adopt h-consciousness and move forward with discussion of its practical applications; this does not have anti-naturalistic implications. (2) A naturalistic account of h-consciousness should be expected, in principle; in neuroscience we are some way towards formulating such an account. (3) Detailed analysis of the notion of consciousness is needed to clearly distinguish p- and h-consciousness. This refers to the notion of subject that is not an object and complementarity of the subjective and objective perspectives.(4) If we can understand the exact mechanism that produces h-consciousness we should be able to engineer it. (5) H-consciousness is probably not a computational process (more like a liver-function). Machines can, in principle, be functionally, phenomenally and h-conscious; all those processes are naturalistic. This is the engineering thesis on machine consciousness formulated within non-reductive naturalism.