Holding Clients Accountable: The Micro-Politics of Trouble in a Work Incentive Program

This paper looks at the micro-politics of trouble in one office of the Work Incentive Program, which is intended to help some welfare recipients in the United States find jobs. Clients who fail to cooperate with staff are called to a conciliation session, presented with a formal complaint, informed of the potential consequences of their uncooperativeness, and held accountable for their actions. This paper focuses on how the conciliation sessions are organized, and their implications for staff and client definitions of cooperation, accountability, organizational purpose, and professional identity. I also consider the broader implications of my findings for studying trouble as a feature of ail human service institutions. Emerson and Messinger's (1949) approach to the micro-politics of trouble emphasizes the emergence of personal troubles as problematic features of ongoing human relationships. These personal troubles become public problems when institutional officials intervene. Moreover, per-sonal troubles are frequently redefined and reorganized as they become public problems through the interpretations of the officials, the reinterpretations of the disputing parties, and the selection of remedies to the troubles. Emerson (1981) shows how such public problems continue to develop