The literature on transition and democratization was for long dominated by internal explanatory factors such as economic performance, civil society, institutions, etc. Only recently have external actors' democratizing efforts – like those of the US and the EU – been systematically incorporated. But the perspective remains too constrained, since only ‘positive’ external actors are considered, while possible ‘negative’ actors are left aside. This article attempts to rectify some of the imbalance. First, an analytical framework that can be used to analyse both positive and negative external actors is proposed. Then, the framework is put into use through an analysis of the negative effects of Russia's foreign policy in the so-called ‘Near Abroad’. It is argued that two general effects take shape: the ‘policy of managed stability’ and the ‘policy of managed instability’. Both are weakening the democratic perspectives in the post-Soviet area, so I argue that Russia's foreign policy in the ‘Near Abroad’ is a, hitherto, underestimated and badly understood ‘negative’ factor in the literature on transition and democratization in the post-Soviet space.
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Jakob Tolstrup (2009) studied this question.
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