The Phenomenology and Epistemology of Existence

Most of the time we see how objects are, but sometimes we see that they are. When we see that some object exists, it seems rational to ground our judgement that it exists on the basis of this experience. How do we explain these observations? A Lockean View says that it is possible to represent the property of existence in perceptual experience and that we ground our perceptual existential judgements on this basis. A Humean View says that it is not possible to represent the property of existence in experience and that we ground our perceptual existential judgements on perceptual experiences that represent objects as having some other properties that indicate their existence. In this article, I shall argue that both views face formidable challenges. A Lockean View faces Hume's Challenge, that is, it seems that there is no property of existence represented in perceptual experience. A Humean View faces the Epistemic Gap Challenge, that is, it is hard to explain the rationality of perceptual existential judgements if they are grounded on experiences that do not represent things as having the property of existence.