Spinoza on Humans as Social Animals

Spinoza repeatedly suggests that humans are set apart from other animals by their rational and moral abilities. Yet he disparages the traditional definition of the human as a ‘rational animal’ and several of his other views suggest that these abilities are not sufficient by themselves to characterize human nature. This article tries to overcome this tension by developing a political interpretation of Spinoza's view of human nature. Spinoza expresses support for the idea that humans are ‘social animals’. Interpreting these endorsements, the article argues that what sets humans apart from other animals is that they live under a distinctive social organization, characterized by him as ‘sovereignty’ ( imperium ). By showing that this organization imposes cognitive and moral demands on those subject to it and that it does not characterize communities of non‐human animals, this political interpretation shows how the rational and moral capacities that characterize humans alone are for Spinoza necessarily embedded in a social context.