This article evaluates the potential of private litigation to effectively complement public enforcement in the UK.
While much attention has been given to the limitations of public competition law enforcement in addressing market failures in the digital economy, the complementary role of private enforcement—particularly through opt-out collective action mechanisms—has received less scrutiny. Yet, in light of the surge in collective actions against Big Tech in the UK, understanding the potential of private litigation to rise as a complement (or even an alternative) to public enforcement is both timely and necessary. This article argues that the UK’s regime of opt-out collective actions, while still nascent in its practical application, shows significant potential to complement—and potentially rival—public enforcement in terms of deterrence and access to justice. It offers a timely and critical evaluation of this regime in action, with a particular focus on its application against Big Tech. Section 2 outlines the normative justifications and design features of the UK opt-out collective action mechanisms. Section 3 analyses the UK regime as applied in practice, focusing on key procedural challenges and pending claims. Section 4 offers a critical evaluation and suggests reforms to ensure the regime’s continued effectiveness.
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Maria Ioannidou (2026) studied this question.
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