Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning-Based State Estimation in Power Distribution Systems

We examine the robustness of machine learning-based distribution system state estimation (DSSE) techniques to a class of adversarial attacks, known as the black-box evasion attack. In these attacks, the attacker manipulates real-time measurements from sensors installed in the distribution grid by adding carefully crafted perturbations to diminish the accuracy of DSSE. We devise a stealthy attack based on the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), dubbed Sneaky-FGSM, by analyzing the statistical properties of real-time measurements and adding perturbations accordingly. Using simulation on a standard test distribution system, we show that this attack would remain largely unidentified and the error introduced in the DSSE process could propagate to a voltage control scheme that takes the DSSE result as input. Our result suggests that incorporating machine learning models in DSSE is a double-edged sword and calls for more research to ensure the robustness of these models to adversarial samples.