Bureaucrats, Policy Attitudes, and Political Behavior: Extension of the Bureau Voting Model of Government Growth

The bureau voting model of government growth is built on three hypotheses: (1) bureaucrats hold attitudes that are more supportive of government spending than are those of nonbureaucrats; (2) government employees are more likely than other citizens to cast votes in elections; and (3) the voting behavior of bureaucrats is more supportive of candidates who advocate increased government spending. Hence, the bureau voting model suggests that, proportionately, the spending preferences of government employees (as reflected in the candidates advantaged by their vote choices) are more likely to have an impact on public policy than are the spending preferences of other citizens. Previous research has tested this model indirectly using data on government employment and aggregate expenditures, but has produced mixed results. This paper adopts a different approach by utilizing survey data from the 1982, 1984, and 1986 National Election Studies to test the hypotheses underlying the bureau voting model. In general, we found that, in comparison to private sector employees, government employees (1) are more “liberal” and supportive of increased public spending, (2) turn out in much higher proportions, and (3) are less likely to support Republican candidates. Further, it appears that the observed differences are better explained by a recruitment-process model than by a socialization-process model.