Coercion Through Threat and Use of Force in Hybrid and Conventional Warfare: the South Caucasus as a Case Study in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and the 2020 Second Karabakh War

Coercion through the threat or application of force, alongside other hybrid tactics, plays a critical role in shaping adversaries’ decisions and influencing geopolitical dynamics. This paper explores how state actors utilize military intimidation, targeted kinetic actions, and strategic positioning to weaken opponents, deter retaliation, and create favorable conditions for broader hybrid operations. Focusing on the South Caucasus within a broader geopolitical context, the study examines historical and contemporary cases to assess the effectiveness, implications, and countermeasures associated with coercive force in hybrid and conventional warfare. By analyzing these dynamics, the research aims to provide a deeper understanding of how coercion is employed as a strategic tool and the ways in which targeted states respond to such threats. It highlights the strategic calculations, effectiveness, and risks associated with coercion as a tool of statecraft. The findings demonstrate that coercion, whether through threats or direct force, is shaped by factors such as power asymmetry, international response, and the credibility of deterrent measures. By understanding the complexities of coercion, policymakers and scholars can better anticipate the risks and opportunities associated with its use in contemporary international relations.