Religion and the crisis in Ukraine

AbstractThis article investigates religious nationalism in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, which has appeared in political and popular rhetoric and has been expressed through violence. From the Tsarist era, Kyiv and Crimea have featured centrally in Russian national mythology as the cradle(s) of Russian Christianity. This nationalist conception of space persisted after political borders changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as has the Russian Orthodox Church's historic jurisdiction in Ukraine. As a result, Russian Orthodox believers retain a special affinity for Kyiv and Crimea, and many Ukrainian citizens have looked to Moscow for matters of faith. Subjects of inquiry include religious nationalism, the baptism of Slavic Prince Vladimir (Volodymyr), Orthodox holy places in Crimea and Ukraine, Patriarch Kirill's Russian World concept, and religious violence in Ukraine and Crimea.Keywords:: OrthodoxyUkraineCrimeaRussiareligious nationalismanti-Semitismanti-IslamChurch and StatePatriarch KirillRussian WorldRussian Orthodox ChurchUkrainian Orthodox Church Notes 1CitationPutin, 'Address by President of the Russian Federation'. 2 See for example, CitationJuergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God; CitationEllens, The Destructive Power of Religion; CitationKimball, When Religion Becomes Evil; CitationSelegnut, Sacred Fury; CitationSchwartz, The Curse of Cain. 3CitationVan der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 7–8. 4 See, for example, CitationHastings, The Construction of Nationhood; CitationSmith, Myths and Memories of the Nation; and (for his treatment of Catholicism in Russian Poland) CitationWeeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia. 5 For a good review of the debates in scholarly literature regarding the questionable utility of such concepts as 'civil society' and 'public sphere' in the Russian context, see CitationBradley, 'Subjects into Citizens'. 6CitationGeraci and Khodarkovsky, Of Religion and Empire, 335. 7 For an excellent discussion of the literature, see CitationCrews, 'Empire and the Confessional State'; CitationCrews, For Prophet and Tsar; CitationWerth, At the Margins of Orthodoxy; Geraci and Khodarkovsky, Of Religion and Empire; CitationBreyfogle, Heretics and Colonizers; CitationGeraci, Window on the East; and CitationBrower and Lazzerini, Russia's Orient. 8CitationCuranović, The Religious Diplomacy of the Russian Federation, 11. 9 In works too numerous to review here, Russian scholar S.B. Filatov has traced the resurgence of religion in Russian mass consciousness and political behaviour. See the foundational study, CitationFilatov and Furman, 'Religiia i politika v massovom soznanii'. Important English language works include: CitationKnox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church; idem, 'The Symphonic Ideal'; CitationPapkova, The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics; CitationRichters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church; CitationWallace, The Orthodox Church and Civil Society in Russia, and CitationCuranović, The Religious Factor in Russia's Foreign Policy. 10CitationLikhachev, Reflections on Russia, 160. 11 In Crimea, as my book, CitationKozelsky, Christianizing Crimea, has shown, this meant remaking the Muslim region as Christian. 12 Scholars have long noted a relationship between religion and empire. In the British context, for example, much of the literature concentrates on the connection between Christianity and commerce. Other studies have shown that nineteenth-century missionaries viewed Christianisation as a companion to civilisation. In Russia, however, the importance of religion for empire was perhaps even stronger, given the close relationship between church and state. For general literature on the topic, see CitationPorter 'Commerce and Christianity'; CitationStanley, 'Commerce and Christianity'; and Citationvan der Veer, Conversion to Modernities. 13 For an interesting discussion of the Church as 'transnational subject of foreign policy', as well as Orthodoxy's role in Russian foreign policy, see CitationCuranović, 'The Attitude of the Moscow Patriarchate towards Other Orthodox Churches'. 14 Vladimir is the Russian form of the name and Volodymyr the Ukrainian form. As will be appreciated, the choice of name may indicate a political stance. Vladimir is used hereafter simply to avoid repetition. 15 Scholars have debated Norman theory from the eighteenth century. CitationRiasanovsky offers the classic English-language summary of the debate in 'The Norman Theory of the Origin of the Russian State'. 16CitationBlady, Jewish Communities in Exotic Places, 116. 17CitationPovest' Vremennykh Let, 258. 18 See for example CitationHrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus, Vol. 1. 19 For substantive discussion of these debates, see CitationPelenski, The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus', and CitationPlokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations, 1–48. 20CitationKaramzin, Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo, 145–60. 21CitationRiasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855, 16. 22CitationWhittaker, 'The Ideology of Sergei Uvarov'; CitationWhittaker, The Origins of Modern Russian Education; and CitationZorin, Kormia Dvuglavogo Orla, 337–74. 23 Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855, 84. 24CitationBulgakov, Metropolitan Makarii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi, 226. 25 Kozelsky, Christianizing Crimea, 41–61. 26 Bulgakov, Metropolitan Makarii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi, 105–6. 27 Ibid., 91–100. 28 Ibid., 98. 29 Ibid., 110. 30 Kozelsky, Christianizing Crimea, 125–49. 31 Popular faith of course did not disappear with the Russian Revolution, nor did the Orthodox Church. The history of the Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet regime is much more complex, however, than can be represented in this article, though the Soviet period was a time of extraordinary trauma for its members, and this experience cannot be forgotten in an assessment of its current resurgence. For a good survey, see CitationPospielovsky, The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, 1917–1982. 32 For a good English-language discussion of the legacy of the Soviet religious policy in the post-Soviet period, see Wallace, The Orthodox Church and Civil Society in Russia, 25–52. 33 A quick search of the Russian national library shows that dozens of Archbishop Innokentii's books and pamphlets have been reprinted in the last 25 years. Resurgent interest relates in part to the prelate's work in Crimea, for which he earned the epitaph 'Patriot of the Fatherland', as well as his extraordinary contribution to Russian Orthodox theology. The UOC-MP canonised Archbishop Innokentii in 1997. See CitationKozelsky, 'Bishop in the Borderland: Archbishop Innokentii (Borisov)', 149–58. 34CitationSysyn, 'Politics and Orthodoxy in Independent Ukraine', 8–19. 35CitationBorowik, 'Orthodoxy Confronting the Collapse of Communism in Post-Soviet Countries', 272. 36CitationDruzhenko, 'An Event of 2005 in State–Religion Relations'. 37 For the emergence of Islamic movements in the post-Soviet states, see CitationWilliams, 'Jihad and Ethnicity in Post Communist Eurasia', 3–24. 38CitationKnox, 'Religious Freedom in Russia: The Putin Years', 285. 39 Ibid., 293–302. 40CitationSuslov, 'Sviataia Rus'', 316. 41CitationPapkova, 'Russian Orthodox Concordat?', 669. 42 Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church, 86–7. 43 Papkova, The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics, 71–93. 44 Papkova, 'Russian Orthodox Concordat?', 667–84. 45 Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church, 75–128 (chaps 5 and 6). 46 Kozelsky, Christianizing Crimea, 175–96; Suslov, 'Sviataia Rus'', 311–27. 47CitationTaylor, Christians and the Holy Places, vii. 48 For a discussion about the relationship between religious pluralism, separation of church and state, and relationship to democracy, see CitationSteinberg and Wanner, Religion, Morality and Community in Post Soviet Society. 49CitationLunkin, 'The Ukrainian Revolution and the Christian Churches', 1. 50CitationUkrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 'Avtokefalia: Istoria'. 51 The 14 autocephalous churches, which recognise each other as canonical and are in full communion with each other, include: The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, Patriarchate of Alexandria, Patriarchate of Antioch, Patriarchate of Jerusalem and Patriarchate of Moscow. 52 Borowik, 'Orthodoxy Confronting the Collapse of Communism in Post-Soviet Countries', fn. 1, 276; Papkova, 'Russian Orthodox Concordat?', 674. 53 Richters, The Post Soviet Russian Orthodox Church, 97. 54CitationRISU, 'Prime Minister and President of Ukraine Address Synod of Bishops of Ukrainian Orthodox Church Ahead of Election of New Metropolitan'. See also RISU, 'Ukraine President Stresses Idea of Single National Orthodox Church'. 55CitationKravchuk, 'Measures for Returning Properties to Religious Organizations', 180. 56 Obstacles to restitution have been extensive. In the plummeting economy of the 1990s, Soviet era occupants of religious institutions could little afford to relocate. More seriously, municipalities often return property selectively, favouring some faiths and discriminating against others. CitationDruzhenko, 'National Report: Ukraine', 730. 57 Plokhy, 'Kyiv vs. Moscow', 141–3. 58CitationRISU, 'Old Conflict among Orthodox in Poltava Continues'; CitationRISU, 'Chernivtsi Authorities Intercede in UOC-MP and UOC-KP Orthodox Conflict'; Citation'Filaret Asks Yanukovich to Prevent Transfer of Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, Pochayiv Lavra to Moscow Patriarchate'. 59CitationDruzhenko, 'Redrafting of the Ukrainian Law on Religious Freedom'. 60CitationRomey, 'Legacies of a Slavic Pompeii', 18–25. References to the Slavic Pompeii extend into the nineteenth century. Complaints about the futility of drawing comparisons between Pompeii and Chersonesos are also quite old. See, for example, CitationBobrinskii, Khersones-Tavricheskii, 178–9. 61 Much of this story has been published in Romey's article cited above; other details come from personal conversations with reserve officials and archaeologists in June of 2006. 62 See Romey, 'Legacies of a Slavic Pompeii', 23–5. 63 Personal communication, Chersonesos, June 30, 2006. 64 Untitled article posted on the website of the Religious Information Service of Ukraine, http://www.risu.org.ua/eng/news/article;1274/. 65 Na visita Imperatskoroe sem'i v Krym, GAARK (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Avtonomnoi Respubliki Krim), f. 118, op. 1, d. 37a. 66CitationAleksii, 'Vo vsiu zemlu izyde veshchaniia ikh'. 67 Ibid. 68 Papkova, 'Russian Orthodox Concordat?', 671. 69 Patriarch Kirill had visited Crimea previously in 2002 while serving as Chair of the Department of the Moscow Patriarchate's External Relations, to deliver relics of the newly canonised Saint Fyodor Ushakov. Ushakov was the Russian Admiral who led the Russian victory over the Turks in the Black Sea; his feats helped secure southern Ukraine for the Russian Empire. His post-Soviet canonisation, as well as the transfer of part of his relics to Sevastopol, offers another symbol of blending Russian Orthodox patriotism on the territory of Ukraine. Citation'V Krymu moriakom-chernomortsam peredali chastitsu sviatyikh moshchei proslavlennogo admiral Fyodora Ushakova'; CitationLyubov, 'Saint Blessed Warrior Fyodor Ushakov'. 70CitationLazar, Metropolitan of Simferopol and Crimea, 'Predstoiatel' Russskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi sovershil Bozhestvennuiu liturgiiu na meste kreshcheniia sviatogo ravnoapostol'nogo kniazia Vladimira'. 71CitationPutin, 'Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskii Federatsii o sozdanii fonda Russkii Mir'. 72CitationRusskii Mir, 'Tret'ia Assembleiia Russkogo Mira'. 73CitationMoscow Patriarchate, 'Vystuplenie Sviateishego Patriarkha Kirilla na torzhestvennom otkrytii III Assamblei Russkogo mira'. 74 Break-away parts of Moldova have requested to join Russia with the Crimean referendum. See for example, Citation'Moldova's Trans-Dniester Region Pleads to Join Russia'. 75 Suslov distinguishes between three different geopolitical projects circulating in Russian nationalist thought: 'Holy Rus', 'Russian World' and 'Eurasianism' (Suslov, 'Sviataia Rus', 312), the latter a fundamentalist Orthodox idea currently associated with Aleksandr Dugin. For the purposes of this article, I consider Kirill's Russian World concept as being interconnected with his 'Holy Rus' concept. However, it is important to bear in mind that Kirill's Russian World concept is only one articulation of many visions expressed in the Russian World conferences. 76 Moscow Patriarchate, 'Vystuplenie Sviateishego Patriarkha Kirilla na torzhestvennom otkrytii III Assamblei Russkogo Mira'. 77Russkii Mir, 'Tret'ia Assembleiia Russkogo Mira'. 78CitationRISU, 'Head of Kyivan Patriarchate Sees Visit of Kirill as Part of the Russian World Political Project'; Citation'Battle of Orthodox Christian Patriarchs as Ukraine's Filaret Denounces Russia's Kirill'. 79CitationRISU, Patriarch Sviatoslav Shevchuk, 'Head of UGCC: "Russian World" Has Nothing to Do with the Church'. 80CitationRISU, 'Patriarch Kirill Refuses to Celebrate Baptism of Rus Anniversary with Patriarch Filaret'. 81CitationKorduban, 'Vladimir Putin, the Mayor of Moscow, and Patriarch Kirill Promote Russian Interests in Ukraine', 4–5. 82 'More than Citation1 Million Believers Venerate St. Andrew's Cross in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus'; CitationRISU, 'Cross of St. Andrew Tours Russia, Ukraine and Belarus'. 83CitationPutin, 'Vstrecha s predstaviteliami pomestnikh pravoslavnykh tserkvei'. 84 'Putin pribyl v Kiev na torzhestva po sluchaiu Citation1025 letiia kreshcheniia Rusi'; CitationZawada, '1,025th Anniversary of Kyivan Rus' Celebrated in Ukraine', 8. 85CitationYelensky and Antoshevskiy, 'State Program of 1025th Anniversary is a Humiliation for Millions of Ukrainian Christians, and it further Divides the Country'. 86CitationRISU, 'Deputy Patriarch of UOC-KP: Moscow Wants to Humiliate Ukraine during the Celebration of the Anniversary of the Baptism of Rus'. 87 Zawada, '1,025th Anniversary of Kyivan Rus' Celebrated in Ukraine', 8; CitationKishkovsky, 'Putin in Ukraine to Celebrate a Christian Anniversary'. 88 Recently, Lunkin has published an excellent survey of different churches' responses to the crisis in the East West Ministry Report. See: 'The Ukrainian Revolution and the Christian Churches', 1–6. 89Citation'UPTs prizvala religioznykh liderov vsego mira osudit' russkiuiu agressiiu protiv Ukrainyi vystupit' zashchitu mira i nedopustit' krovoprolitiia'. 90 Moscow Patriarchate, 'Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church'. 91CitationPapkova, 'Solidarity and Separation'; CitationIurash and Oivin, 'Mnenie'. 92 RISU, 'Baptists of Russia are Instructed to Annex all Evangelical Baptists in Crimea'; CitationRISU, 'Crimean Tatars offered their Mosques to the Orthodox Christians of Kyiv Patriarchate to hold services'; CitationBilocerkowycz and Kochmar, 'Ukrainian Catholics Experiencing 'Total Persecution' in Crimea'; CitationVasyn, 'Crimea and Religious Freedom'. 93Citation'Ravil Gaynutdin Arrived in Crimea'. 94CitationIzmirli, 'Crimean Tatars Fear for their Safety after Crimea's Annexation to Russia'. 95 'UN Refugee Agency Says at Least Citation10,000 have Fled Ukraine Crisis'. 96Citation'Terrorists Kidnapped, Tortured and Threatened Believers in Donbas'. 97 Ibid. 98 The nature of anti-Semitism within the Ukrainian crisis has become muddled by propaganda from all sides. Joseph Zissel, President of the Association for Jewish organisations and societies, has argued that anti-Semitism has not figured as significantly within Euromaidan as the media (particularly Russian media) suggest. See, for example: Zissel, 'V Ukraine nizkii uroven' antisemitiskikh proiavlenii, i ikh kolichestvo neuklonno umen'shaetsia'. 99 'Terrorists Kidnapped, Tortured and Threatened Believers in Donbas'.100CitationFeldman, 'Ukraine "Euromaidan" Protests Must Shun Anti-Semitism Nationalist Parties and Offensive Skits Must End'. CitationLuhn, 'The Ukrainian Nationalism at the Heart of Euromaidan'.101CitationEnnis, 'Russian Jews Fear Rising Anti-Semitism amid Crimea Fervour'.102 See the letter from Archbishop Eulogius (Hutchenko) of Sumy and Okhtyrka, UOC-MP, to President Putin asking for the cessation of Russian military build-up on Ukrainian borders. CitationRISU, 'Ukrainian Orthodox Bishop Calls on Putin to Withdraw Troops from Border with Ukraine'; see also, Papkova, 'Solidarity and Separation'.Additional informationNotes on contributorsMara KozelskyMara Kozelsky is Associate Professor of History at the University of South Alabama and is the author of Christianizing Crimea: Shaping Sacred Space in the Russian Empire and Beyond (Northern Illinois University Press, 2010). Additionally, she has published numerous articles, and has co-edited two volumes: with Philip P. Kohl and Nachmen ben Yahuda, Selected Remembrances: Archaeology in the Construction, Commemoration, and Consecration of National Pasts (University of Chicago Press, 2008); and with Lucien Frary, Russian Ottoman Borderlands: the Eastern Question Reconsidered (University of Wisconsin Press, 2014). Currently, she is working on a book about the Crimean War, tentatively titled War and Recovery.